William and Mary Review of Virginia Law
Volume 2 (1954-1956)
Issue 3

Article 3

May 1956

Criminal Law (Survey of Virginia Case Law - 1955)
John C. Baker

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Repository Citation
John C. Baker, Criminal Law (Survey of Virginia Case Law - 1955), 2 Wm. & Mary Rev. Va. L. 222
(1956), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval/vol2/iss3/3
Copyright c 1956 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmrval

CRIMINAL. LAW
Rape-Testimony Allegedly Incredible and Contrary
to Human Events. The Court was asked in the Bradley'
case to set aside the verdict of the jury because the prosecutrix's
version of the evidence was allegedly contrary to human events
and inherently incredible. The prosecutrix testified that she
was accosted on a lonely street about 2:30 P.M. and dragged
through mud and snow to a peanut shed where she was attacked.
The defendant then forced the prosecutrix by threats of harm
to go with him to several houses which were occupied by his
friends. The prosecutrix declared she was afraid to call for help
because of these threats. Around 5:00 P.M. the prosecutrix managed to escape and return to her place of employment when she
notified the police immediately. Her testimony was corroborated
by other witnesses. They testified that the prosecutrix was hysterical; that her clothes were muddy; that peanut hulls were
found in her clothes; that impressions were found in the mud near
the peanut shed; that the defendant was wearing the clothes described by the prosecutrix; and, that peanut hulls also were found
in his clothes. A doctor confirmed that she had been criminally
attacked. The defendant's testimony was contradicted on material points, and his testimony was at variance with a prior signed
statement. Upon this evidence, the court held that it was the
function of the jury to determine whether the testimony was
contrary to human experience, and that it could not be held as a
matter of law that the reactions of the prosecutrix under the circumstances were not consistent with normal reactions. The
court stated:
Her prompt report when she reached friends, her physical
and mental condition at the time and corroboration of much
of her testimony warranted the jury in accepting her evi2
dence and returning a verdict of guilty.
Two judges dissented on the fact that she was with the defendant
from 2:30 P.M. to 5 P.M., a period of two and one-half hours,
without appealing for help. The court's decision is compatible
1 Bradley v. Comnonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 86 S.E.2d 828 (1955).
2 196 Va. 1126, 1137, 86 S.E.2d 828, 835 (1955).

222

with the result in the Garyg case, where the court upheld the
verdict of the jury, and where there was a similarity of certain
facts. The Legion 4 case, which is cited by the dissenting judges,
can be distinguished on the facts. There the defendant, unarmed,
entered the house, took the prosecutrix into another room and
committed the alleged act while the husband gave no alarm,
made no protest, offered no resistance, although it was a settled
neighborhood.
Rape-Breaking and Entering With Intent to Commit
Rape. The defendant was indicted under Section 18-160, Code
of Virginia (1950), as amended, for breaking and entering a certain storehouse building with the intent to commit rape.3 The
prosecutrix received several indecent proposals over the phone,
anonymously made by the defendant. Then the defendant entered a cleaning establishment through the back door and was
apprehended by detectives before he could enter through a second door into the well-lighted front office where the prosecutrix
was working. A conviction in the trial court was set aside, and
the case dismissed bn appeal. The court held that where a
statute makes an offense consist of an act combined with a particular intent, it is necessary for the intent to be established as a
matter of fact before conviction can be had. Surmise and speculation as to existence of intent are not sufficient. The evidence
was consistent with the desire to have intercourse, but it was not
sufficient to establish intention to use force, merely persuasion.
The result in this case is consistent with the decisions in the
HairstonO and Woodson7 cases where the evidence was held not
sufficient to prove an intent to commit rape. In the former case,
the accused made indecent proposals to the prosecutrix as she
stood on the edge of a yard, and then started towards her renewing his requests, but did not touch her. The court observed:
There was no attempt to use force, no threat, only solicitation. The absence of all violence and of evidence of an intention, if necessary to overcome the will of the prosecu8 Gray v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 236, 35 S.E.2d 165 (1945).

4 Legions v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 89, 23 S.E2d 764 (1943).
5

Dixon v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 380; 89 S.E.2d 344 (1955).
e Hairston v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 754; 32 S.E. 797 (1899).
7 Woodson v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 895; 59 S.E. 1097 (190).
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trix; the time and the place, and all the surrounding circumstances invest the charge with very great improbability.
However reprehensible' is the conduct of the accused, the
evidence is consistent with a desire on his part to have sexual
intercourse with the prosecutrix, but, without evidence of
an intention to use force, if necessary, to gratify desire-only
persuasion.8
In the latter case the prosecutrix was accosted by the accused,
who seized her arm. The prosecutrix screamed and ran to a
neighbor's house, and the accused was not at the scene of the
incident when the neighbor returned there. The court reversed
a conviction of attempted rape on the authority of the Hairston
case. Although the Hairston case and the Woodson case were
prosecutions for attempted rape, and the incidents were in the
day time and outdoors, and the incidents of the Dixon case took
place at nighttime after the accused had entered a building, there
still was no evidence that the accused had the intent to force intercourse upon the prosecutrix against her will. In view of the
above cases, it appears that the Commonwealth must offer evidence of an overt act which is consistent only with an intent to
have intercourse by force or threat of force, in order to convict.
Rape-Admissibility of Evidence. The court reversed and
remanded for a new trial a conviction in the Day case9 because
the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the accused
chased another woman a short time before the alleged act. Since
this case involved the admissibility of evidence, it is discussed in
detail in the EVIDENCE section of this Review.
Homicide-Change of Venue and Sufficiency of Evidence. The accused in the Farrowt0 case was charged with the
killing of a deputy sheriff, and he moved the trial court for a
change of venue on the grounds that the local newspaper had
misled the citizens of the county and that there was wide-spread
ill feeling toward the accused in the county. Affirming the decision of the trial court, the court held that the accused's evidence
was insufficient to support these claims, and the decision of the
trial court will not be upset unless there is a clear showing of
8
9

Hairston v. Commonwealth, supra.
Day v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907; 86 S.E.2d 23 (1955).

10 Farfrow v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 353; 89 S.E.2d 313 (1955).

224

abuse of discretion. The only evidence offered by the accused
was a short newspaper article stating only the facts and testimony
by persons who were interested in the outcome on the side of the
accused. This result seems to be the settled rule in Virginia, and
in order to overcome the presumption that the defendant will get
a fair and impartial trial, it must affirmatively appear that there is
such a feeling of prejudice prevailing in the community as will be
reasonably certain to prevent a fair and impartial trial, before the
court is justified in granting a change of venue." The evidence
of the Commonwealth was sufficient to support the verdict of the
jury, finding the defendant guilty of second degree murder. The
court stated:
When the Commonwealth proved that the defendant committed the homicide with a deadly weapon there arose a
presumption of murder in the second degree and unless evidence of the defendant shows circumstances of justification,
alleviation or excuse, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of
his guilt, the verdict of the jury was warranted and must be
12
affirmed.
Although the defendant's evidence was to the effect that the
shooting was accidental, the jury was warranted in rejecting the
evidence of the defendant from the facts and circumstances attending the homicide. The jury is not required to believe the
defendant's testimony just because he said it happened that way.
They may take into account the'improbability of the defendant's
testimony and his manner of telling it in connection with the
circumstances attending the facts.' 3
Instructions-Assault and Battery. The court in the
Harper4 case laid down the acceptable instruction on the apparent danger test and the correct instruction to be given where
the defendant included evidence of his' character. The latter instruction will not be discussed in this section since it is a question
of evidence. The defendant was convicted of assault and battery
on conflicting evidence, and assigned as error the trial court's ac11 Hampton v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 531; 58 S.E.2d 1288 (1950).
12 See note 10, supra.
18 Randolph v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 256, 56 S.E.2d 226 (1949). Johnson
v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 848, 51 S.E.2d 152 (1948).
14Harper v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 723; 85 S.E.2d 249 (1955).

tion in amending his instruction by deleting the words in parentheses:
The court instructs the jury if the jury believes from the
evidence in this case that the defendant was assaulted... in
such manner as to make it appear to the defendant at the
time that... manifested, intended and endeavored to take
his life or do him some bodily harm and that the damage
was imminent and impending, then in that case the defendant if he was not the aggressor was not bound to retreat
but have (had) the right to stand his ground, repel force
with force, and do whatever necessary to save his own life
or prevent his receiving great bodily injury, (and it is not
necessary that it appear to the jury to have been neces-

sary).

The court held that it was not error to delete the above words in
parentheses, that the instruction requested made no well-defined
distinction between actual and apparent danger, and that the
deleted part was awkwardly and ambiguously expressed. Also,
it was confusing and was calculated to mislead the jury. The
instruction was correct as far as it went, but standing alone it was
incomplete. The jury should have been told that before an accused can attack his adversary, he must honestly believe and must
have reasonable cause to believe that he was in imminent danger
of losing his life, and not what would have appeared to some other
reasonable person under similar circumstances. Since the Wilkinson case (1923),118 the court has consistently held that the test is
what reasonably appeared to the defendant at the time of the
attack, but there is authority in other jurisdictions that the test is
what would have appeared to a reasonable man under similar circumstances.1 7 Although the defendant was not relying on the
"reasonable man" test, he used an instruction similar to a court
approved instruction offered in the Forttme8 case. But the court
distinguished that case from the present one on the basis that in
the Fortune case a later instruction clearly explained the expression, and the defendant did not offer such an explanatory instruction in the case now under consideration. The court also
151 d. at 729, 85 S.E2d at 253.
1

6 Wilkinson v. Allen, 136 Va. 607; 118 S.E. 94 (1923).

17 6 C.J.S, Assault and Battery, §18 (1937.
18
Fortune v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 669, 112 S.E. 861 (1922).

stated that the trial court fairly and fully instructed the jury, and
in fact, one instruction given at the request of the accused, was
more favorable than the correct principles of law permitted. This
instruction was erroneous because it told the jury that the accused was justified in striking his adversary if the latter "angrily"
cursed or acted in a threatening manner. The correct instruction
should be that force is justified when the adversary makes some
overt act indicative to the accused of imminent danger. 19
Malicious Wounding-Sufficiency of Evidence. The de20
fendant was found guilty by the jury of malicious wounding.
The victim was wounded as he was driving away from the defendant's home. The bullet was of an unknown caliber which
was fired at right angles to the defendant's house through the
glass window of the car. The defendant later gave contradictory
statements as to the firing of a pistol in his house, and denied seeing the victim when questioned by the sheriff. He also had no
motive for shooting the victim, but did drive past the victim after
the wounding without offering help. No report was heard and
the shot could have been fired by other persons on or off the
premises. Also, the defendant could not have fired the shot from
the position where he was seen only a few moments before the
wounding. The court on appeal reversed and remanded the
decision because on the facts the evidence was not sufficient to
support the verdict. A conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence in a criminal case, but should be acted upon with utmost caution, and the burden is on the Commonwealth to show
that time, place, motive, means and conduct concur in pointing
out the defendant as the criminal agent.2 1 But it is not necessary
for the Commonwealth to establish motive, because the proof of
motive does not establish guilt or the lack of it establish the innocence of the accused.22 The actions of the defendant were of
suspicious circumstances, but the evidence falls short of the proof
which is necessary for a conviction. The commission of crime
by the defendant must be shown by evidence beyond a reason'sStoneman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. (66 Va.) 887 (1874); Berkeley v.
Commonwealth, 88 Va. 1017, 14 S.E. 916 (1892).
20
Van Dyke v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1037, 86 SZE.2d 848 (1955).
2 1
Dean v. Commonwealth, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 912 (1879).
22 Ferrel v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 861; 14 S.E.2d 1293 (1941).
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able doubt to sustain his conviction. 2 Although the defendant's
actions were of a very suspicious nature, and it is not beyond the
imagination to come to a conclusion that the defendant was
guilty, the decision of the court is supported by a long line of
cases which involved the use of circumstantial evidence, and
where it was possible, or probable, that the defendant was guilty,
but all the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was guilty.24.
Narcotic Drugs and Illegally Acquired Liquor-Sufficiency of Evidence. In the Cris~man25 and Sturgis"0 cases, the
defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
verdict of the lower court. In both cases, the court cited the rule
that on appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, granting all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn therefrom. 27 The court in the Crisman case reversed
and remanded, and in the Sturgis case the evidence was sufficient
to support conviction; it was reversed, however, for errors of
admission of evidence. In the Crisman case the defendants, two
brothers, were convicted of unlawful possession of narcotic drugs
in violation of Section 54-488, Code of Virginia (1950). The
Commonwealth's evidence showed that a small quantity of heroin
was found on the floor of the back seat of the car in which the
defendants were riding, with three men in the front seat, shortly
after the defendants had visited a house under police surveillance.
The court, citing Spratley v. Commonwealth,2s stated:
.. . The mere presence of a person in an automobile in
which intoxicating liquor is being transported, with or
without his knowledge, which is not shown to be owned
by him or under his possession or control, single or joint,
is not a crime; nor is it made by the statute of Virginia
28 Power v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 669, 30 SE.2d 22 (1941).
24

Harchett v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. 1026 (1882); Bundick v. Common-

wealth, 97 Va. 787, 34 SE. 454 (1899); Brown v. Commonwealth, 97
Va. 791, 34 SE. 882 (1900); Massie v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 557,
125 SE. 146 (1924); Power v. Commonwealth, Note 23, supra;La Prade
v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 410, 61 S.E.2d 313 (1950); Smith v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 453, 65 S.E.2d 528 (1951).
25
Crisman v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 17, 87 S.E2d 796 (1955).
2
6 Sturgis v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 264, 88 S.E.2d 919 (1955).
27 See Note 23, supra.
2

SSpratley v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 854, 15 S.E. 362 (1930).

Prima Facie evidence of his transportation of or aiding or
abetting the transportation of the intoxicating liquor in the
automobile; nor is it alone sufficient to sustain a conviction
of him upon a charge of transporting intoxicating liquor. 29
Here the Commonwealth showed merely that a small quantity of
heroin was found, and anyone of the five occupants of the car
could have placed it there. Also, there was no evidence as to
who had possession of it. Mere speculation is not proof of guilt
sufficient to support the verdict. The case now under consideration seems to be directly in point with the Spratley case, and if
anything, the facts were more favorable to the Commonwealth
in the present case than in the Spratley case.
In the Sturgis case the accused was found guilty of transporting illegal alcoholic beverages. The Commonwealth's evidence
proved that while the defendant was fleeing arrest he threw out a
jug; as soon as the chase had terminated, the officers returned to
the point where the jug was thrown, and the area "reeked with
the smell of bootleg whiskey." They also discovered a wet spot
where the container's contents had spilled on the ground. They
found no federal stamps affixed to pieces of the jug, and the defendant offered no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption
of illegal acquisition arising from the fact the container bore no
Government stamps.80 The court held that the Commonwealth
had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
" . . . (1) transporting alcoholic beverages, and (2) that they
had been 'illegally acquired' by him." 3 ' The above was proved
by the fact that officers saw the jug thrown; that they found the
spot later and that there was no other occupant of the car. Also,
the defendant did not offer any evidence to rebut the presumption
of "illegally acquired" when no "stamps" were found on the container. In the Miller case, 2 the constitutionality of Section 4-75,
Code of Virginia (1950) was decided in favor of the Commonwealth, and the Sturgis case is directly in point. However, the
case was reversed and remanded on other grounds previously
stated.
John C. Baker
29 Id.
3

OVa. Code 54-75 (1950); Miller v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 639, 2 S.E.2d

3

1

34 (1939).
See Note 26, supra.

82 See Note 30, supra.

